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Abstract 
Growing attention has been given to the role of commissioning as part of a policy environment that 
has emphasised the promotion of greater supplier diversity in the provision of public services, with the 
public sector acting primarily as ‘system leader’ rather than ‘direct deliverer’. In contrast to earlier 
policy which referred to procurement of public services, the shift to commissioning offered the hope of 
a cyclical purchasing process that is grounded in the needs of its population, encourages innovations 
in service design, sensitively  manages a local ‘market’ of suppliers, and can create well integrated, 
comprehensive services. From a third sector perspective commissioning is viewed, it seems, with a 
mixture of guarded optimism and concern due to its crucial importance in shaping the nature of the 
relationship between that part of the sector that delivers services and the state which funds it.  
This working paper provides an initial report on research that sets out to discover the realities of 
commissioning from the perspective of the public sector bodies responsible for its implementation and 
the third sector organisations who choose to engage with commissioners as part of achieving their 
missions. Based on a case study service field (mental health) and geographical locality (an urban 
conurbation in the UK), a survey and series of semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key 
stakeholders from the public and third sectors to understand the practices of commissioning. Due to 
the key focus (and often concerns) of third sector organisations on procurement this was explored in 
particular. 
The findings suggest that within, this case study locality and service field, at least the 
commissioning cycle is not yet in full operation. For both commissioners and TSOs the procurement 
and contracting elements continue to take precedence. Whilst there is evidence that practice around 
these elements has changed to some extent (in particular the greater use of contracts rather than 
grants and more competitive processes), there is also considerable continuity in the importance of 
personal relations between the commissioner and provider and which organisations receive funding. 
In contrast with previous studies, many of the TSOs welcomed regular tendering as an opportunity to 
expand their services and also as it involves the public sector reviewing what they fund. From the 
perspective of TSOs the public sector can improve its practices through ensuring that its 
commissioning staff have the skills and experience to undertake these roles, that the organisational 
processes are undertaken effectively and fairly, and that the different commissioning teams work 
across the user and service group silos. The tendency of the public sector to undertake whole system 
(e.g. health) and internal organisational (e.g. social care) changes appear to lead to considerable 
disruption in the commissioning process and the relationships that underpin it. From the findings of 
this study commissioning is still to fulfil its expected potential in relation to improving outcomes for 
people with mental health problems and efficiencies within the system. It is not possible to infer if this 
is purely a question of commissioning not being implemented thoroughly as yet or if its principles are 
fundamentally flawed – what is clear is that without the necessary capacity, time and expertise it is 
unlikely to succeed. 
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4 
Introduction 
The concept and discourse of commissioning has grown rapidly in prominence in UK public policy and 
public services in recent years, with particular resonance in discussions about the state’s engagement 
of third sector and other non-state actors delivering in an increasingly mixed economy of public 
services (Murray, 2011; Dominey, 2012). Commissioning is not a sudden innovation, but rather is 
consistent with wider international trends towards the diversification of providers within public services, 
and dissatisfaction with existing contracting models (especially in relation to state-third sector 
organisation (TSO) relationships). In an international context the term ‘commissioning’ is rarely used 
and would be considered to be part of processes of externalisation, contracting out, or privatisation 
(Ramia and Carney, 2005). But the prominence given to commissioning has an important national UK 
dimension and is closely linked to a number of active debates, especially the rise of interest in 
mechanisms that are concerned to specify, incentivise and reward particular outcomes, in particular 
Payment by Results (PbR), commissioning for outcomes, and the related ideas of Social Impact 
Bonds (SIBs) and social return on investment (Arvidson et al., 2011; Sturgess et al., 2011).  
These developments have in turn been driven by doubt over the ability of states to bear the costs 
of welfare spending and particularly to control and reduce demand in the context of fiscal stresses on 
public spending (Bartlett, 2009). The current UK Coalition government has developed policy that has 
put commissioning very much at the heart of public service reform; amidst other drivers that include  
diversification of provision, personalisation, and a greater emphasis on rewarding ‘outcomes’ 
(including through the use of the aforementioned PbR) (HM Government, 2011; Rees et al., 2013). In 
doing so it has built on the work begun under the previous Labour government to use ‘commissioning’ 
as a process to facilitate improvement in the design, delivery and assessment of publicly funded 
services.  Despite this continued belief Macmillan (2010) and Rees (2013) note that we still do not fully 
understand how commissioning actually changes the outcomes delivered on the ground: “less 
research attention has been given to the nature of the services commissioned [and] whether new 
commissioning processes are leading to service improvement” (Macmillan, 2010: 4). 
In relation to the third sector in particular, as highlighted by Macmillan, “commissioning and 
procurement is acknowledged to be a complex set of processes, with numerous reports of how 
difficult, confusing and uncertain TSOs find the new service delivery landscape” (Macmillan, 2010, 2). 
In the conclusion to Macmillan’s review it was recommended that research attention be paid to 
commissioning models, the responses of third sector organisations (TSOs) (including the potential of 
partnership and collaboration), and the impact of commissioning on individual organisations. 
Responding to these recommendations, this paper reports on research into the experiences of third 
sector organisations (TSOs) of public sector commissioning of services for people of working age with 
mental health needs, in a large conurbation in England. The research also builds on other work in the 
TSRC’s service delivery stream, for example considering partnership working and the commissioning 
of the Work Programme (see Damm, 2012; Rees et al., 2013). The research explored three central 
themes: 
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• Is commissioning (and procurement and contracting as part of this) different to what went 
before?  
• What are TSOs’ experiences of procurement and contracting under a ‘commissioning 
environment?  
• What factors appear to influence the positive implementation of commissioning? 
The paper is organised as follows. The first section reviews key issues connected with commissioning 
in general and mental health specifically: its definition, the importance of commissioning for the third 
sector and the current context within mental health services. The second section describes the data 
and methods that were employed in the research project and the third  the findings of the research in 
detail. The fourth and final section discusses the findings, sets out initial conclusions and key 
recommendations for policy and future research. 
Section 1: Setting the Context: commissioning, the third sector, and mental health 
1(a) Defining commissioning  
Commissioning has its roots in the movement of public services away from the public sector that 
began with the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) based reforms from the 1980s onwards, 
and that began with contracting out through the Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) regime 
(Entwistle and Martin, 2005). Resistance to some of these approaches led to a greater emphasis on 
partnership working and collaborative procurement approaches, expressed in particular through the 
adoption of the Best Value regime, Public-Private Partnerships and the Public Finance Initiative in the 
1990s (Powell, 1997; Bovaird and Downe, 2006). A discourse of partnership was particularly in 
evidence in relation to the promotion of third sector involvement in public service delivery in the New 
Labour era – a period that has been characterised as one of ‘hyperactive mainstreaming’ – and which 
was enshrined in a state-voluntary sector Compact (Carmel and Harlock, 2008; Lewis, 2005; Kendall, 
2009).  
However as noted, the general shift underlying this was of state withdrawal from direct provision, 
expressed perhaps most concisely in Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) prescription that governments 
should steer, but not row – commissioning is clearly consistent with this principle. Commissioning has 
been defined by the Cabinet Office (2006: 4) as “'the cycle of assessing the needs of people in an 
area, designing and then securing an appropriate service” (see also Kimantas and Dawson, 2008; 
Dominey, 2012). This definition resurfaced in the Coalition government’s Green Paper on 
Commissioning (Cabinet Office, 2010: 7), although the word ‘outcomes’ was used instead of ‘service’. 
Commissioning has long been thought of as ideally operating as a ‘cycle’ and as Bovaird et al. (2012) 
have found, the widespread adoption of commissioning across Government involved acceptance of 
the basic cycle model, although there was considerable variation in the specific emphasis accorded to 
parts of the cycle between different departments. Indeed, the Cabinet Office has presented 
commissioning in an even more stripped down version as ‘understand-plan-do-review’ (see figure 1b 
for a similar scheme). Moreover, a further point of enduring debate within the commissioning policy 
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discussion has been the distinction with ‘procurement’ (Tanner, 2007; Martikke and Moxham, 2010). 
As Macmillan puts it: 
Procurement is the range of processes involved in purchasing goods and services from 
provider organisations, in whatever sector. Commissioning is a broader set of service 
delivery processes which involve consultation, needs assessment and service planning 
and design. If procurement is about shopping, commissioning is about deciding what to 
buy and how. (2010: 9) 
As Bovaird and Davies (2011) point out, commissioning in public administration was originally more 
akin to a straightforward procurement or purchase decision. Later, the ‘first wave’ of modern 
commissioning was associated with the introduction of CCT in the 1980s which embedded the 
‘purchaser-provider’ split as an enduring aspect of public service reform. The ‘second wave’ Bovaird 
and Davies identified as a shift to ‘strategic commissioning’ associated with the Every Child Matters 
White Paper and the development of a strategic commissioning framework for the Children’s Act 
(2004). From this point the concept of strategic commissioning rapidly spread across government 
particularly in those departments concerned with personal services, and the language of 
commissioning has come to dominate political and practice discourse.  
In common usage though commissioning is perhaps just as likely to be used to mean ‘being 
purchased to provide a service’, even though this may well muddy the water in terms of a distinction 
with procurement. Commissioning proper arguably should mean ‘where the cycle operates in full’ but 
where the reality falls short or is circumvented in some way – might the implication be that the term 
should not be used? Commissioning might be intrinsically unstable in its meaning, and seeking a 
consensual definition could be doomed to failure. There is also a potential conflict – particularly in local 
government, and especially now that deep budget reductions are being made – between 
commissioning as something that is about securing cost savings and driving outsourcing, and where 
commissioning is a description of something more collaborative, trust-based and networked and about 
participative planning for social outcomes. It may therefore be useful to view commissioning as 
operating on a continuum – between ‘intelligent/collaborative’ commissioning on one side and 
‘commissioning on price/procurement’ on the other.  
1(b) The realities of commissioning 
The concept of commissioning appears broadly consistent with the idea of the ‘enabling state’ 
continuing to step back from direct delivery. However, there has been unhelpful confusion as to 
whether delivery is part of, or quite separate from commissioning. The Labour-era central government 
policy documents reviewed by Bovaird et al. (2012) are inconsistent: some explicitly separate 
‘commissioning’ from ‘providing’ while others state that delivery is part of the commissioning cycle. 
Arguably more important though is that a number of additional agendas have been loaded onto 
commissioning, including the New Labour government’s stress on inter-agency and cross-sector 
partnership working, the aspiration to better involve citizens in design of services including the rise of 
interest in personalisation (Lewis, 2005; Needham, 2010), and the growing interest in commissioning 
for outcomes rather than outputs (Bovaird and Davies, 2011; Sturgess et al., 2011).  
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Figure 1. The commissioning cycle model. Source: (a) Bovaird et al. (2012), (b) NAVCA (2010)  
 
Although there appears to be a level of consensus surrounding what commissioning is and how it 
should operate (at least as a ‘model’), there has been a persistent feeling to date that the model rarely 
if ever matches reality and that even where a tendering process has been labelled as ‘commissioning’ 
what is actually occurring is in fact ‘procurement’ (Packwood, 2007). From a third sector perspective, 
there has typically been a range of complaints that TSOs have not been involved in the full cycle, 
particularly service specification/re-design (See Figure 1) (Martikke and Moxham, 2010). Despite the 
apparently widespread influence of commissioning, because of the complex and multi-tiered reality of 
service delivery due to the balance of responsibilities between central government, local government, 
and executive agencies of government, real practice in public sector commissioning is likely to be 
highly divergent. Practice in one service delivery field (e.g. employment, health or advice services) 
could have little bearing on or relation to the realities of practice in another. The interaction of 
commissioning practice in local government with that in other public services is complex and further 
uncertainty seems likely to be introduced by the profound public service reforms that are occurring, 
particularly to the NHS (Miller, 2013). For these reasons generalisations are likely to be very difficult to 
make. Particular variation can be observed in the reaction of local authorities to the commissioning 
agenda. Pro-commissioning councils can be identified as those which have adopted aspirational titles 
such as ‘Total Commissioning’ or brands such as the ‘EasyJet’ council. Dissenting councils have 
adopted alternative broad strategies such as co-operative or mutual (‘John Lewis’) council models. It 
can be argued that there is further group who have resisted through inertia or withdrawal. For the third 
sector therefore (as well as private and other public agencies) who might want to provide 
commissioned services, the picture of who is commissioning services, and in what way, is likely to be 
an intricate one.  
Unfortunately, one of the legacies of the earlier phase of policy development has been confusion in 
practice over the core meaning of commissioning. Although there has been more experience of 
commissioning in the health and social care policy arenas, Checkland et al. (2012: 540) were still 
moved to comment that “we also found that both commissioners and providers struggled with the 
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more fundamental ideas underpinning commissioning”, suggesting that shared understanding is far 
from the norm. In the health field in particular, further uncertainty is caused by the potentially profound 
institutional upheaval caused by a combination of funding reductions and the structural reform of the 
NHS (Dickinson and Miller, 2011). All of this suggests that the essential meaning of commissioning – 
and hence its application – is quite contested: on the one hand it could be used to facilitate or 
emphasise competition, market-testing, contestability and transparency, on the other it could be more 
about collaboration, partnership, dialogue and negotiation. The third sector clearly has a stake in this 
debate. 
The previous Labour government acknowledged that the third sector might deserve special 
consideration in policy. The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) (2006) 
proposed government adopt ‘intelligent’ commissioning meaning that the sector could expect 
sustainable and longer term funding with a level playing field with the private sector and a framework 
that could allow innovation to flourish. Similarly the Office for the Third Sector (2006) advocated 
‘commissioning principles’ that essentially posited a framework that involved a strategic focus on 
outcomes, a diversity of providers, and the involvement of service users and providers in the full cycle. 
Third sector-based reports have advocated improved commissioning processes in specific service 
fields such as welfare to work that take better account of the third sector’s contribution (and might 
result in more commissioning from the sector) (Third Sector Task Force, 2009). NAVCA (2010) also 
favoured the idea of intelligent commissioning, describing it as practices that enable good outcomes 
for people, that are value for money, and that enable genuine collaboration between commissioners, 
the voluntary sector, and service users.  
With the arrival of the 2010 Coalition government policy there has arguably been another shift, with 
commissioning even more high profile but set within a rather more narrowly instrumental agenda: as a 
tool to promote greater contestability, competition and provider diversity (HM Government, 2011). On 
the other hand, there has also been a recognition of similar sorts of constraints as the previous 
administration, more recent policy developments have emphasized improving the skills of 
commissioners through a ‘Commissioning Academy’ and ‘levelling the playing field’ through the 
requirement for commissioners to consider social value in the Social Value Act (HM Government, 
2014). 
1(c) The mental health policy context 
Whilst there have been numerous strategies, guidance and acts of parliament over the past two 
decades (Hardy, 2011), none have arguably had as great an impact as the National Service 
Framework for Mental Health. Published in 1999, this required local areas to develop a range of new 
community services as a means to reducing reliance on in-patient beds and facilitating the closure of 
remaining long-stay NHS institutions. It emphasised key principles that people with mental health 
problems could expect, including a right to be involved in the planning and delivery of their care, to be 
offered choice and to experience support that is co-ordinated around their needs (DH, 1999). These 
principles, and the dual focus on enabling access to and delivery of services for those who have a 
mental health problem and their families, alongside promoting the mental well-being of the general 
population continue to underpin current thinking (Bennett et al., 2011). Key policy developments since 
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the NSF include a greater focus on recovery (which requires a holistic approach to supporting people 
that moves beyond symptoms to consider their overall quality of life and social situation) (Slade, 2009, 
Shepherd et al., 2010), improved access to psychological therapies, and the introduction of user-held 
budgets in social (and now health) care. Whilst health and social care services still have key roles, the 
current strategy (DH, 2011, DH, 2012a) attempts to more clearly articulate the responsibility of other 
public sector services to achieving its objectives (see Text Box 1). Particular emphasis is given to the 
roles of housing and criminal justice in responding to the particular issues faced by the homeless and 
those who have offended (ibid), and employment services due to the well-established impact of not 
being in work due to mental health problems and a consequent loss of self-esteem, exclusion from 
societal networks, and limited income (ibid, McManus et al 2012). There has also been an increasing 
focus on the link between physical and mental health (DH 2012b, Kings Fund & Centre for Mental 
Health 2012) and the need to ensure that both aspects of people’s well-being are dealt with ‘parity’ 
(Centre for Economic Performance 2012, Health Select Committee 2013). 
Text Box 1: Objectives of ‘No Health without Mental Health’ (DH 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National guidance regarding the commissioning of mental health services has largely been targeted 
towards health, or health and social commissioners (e.g. Bennett et al., 2011, NMHDU, 2009, NICE 
2011). The proposed cycles are variants of those outlined above, with an expectation that they will 
operate at different levels – the individual person, the GP practice, and for whole populations. In 
comparison to other models there is a more explicit emphasis on managing risk and putting people 
who receive services at the centre of the process. The latter has been described as a vital component 
due to the statutory and regulatory requirements, greater likelihood that people accessing services will 
be receive a service that they value, and previous evidence that it results in essential improvements 
being achieved (NMHDU, 2011). A ‘values based’ approach has been developed that builds on the 
importance of active engagement of people accessing services in the cycle. Described as ‘a new and 
innovative way of commissioning mental health services’, values based commissioning ‘moves away 
from the dominance of clinician experience and scientific evidence that has been prioritised over 
service user values and experience in traditional commissioning processes’ (Perry et al., 2012: 6). 
In line with other English health services, responsibilities for mental health has been restructured 
under the recent reforms so that the majority of local clinical services are purchased by Clinical 
Commissioning Groups led by GPs, specialist health services (such as secure provision for offenders, 
services for people who are deaf and for adults with eating disorders) by the national body NHS 
England, and public mental health and social care services by Local Authorities. A number of 
More people will have good mental health  
More people with mental health problems will recover  
More people with mental health problems will have good physical health  
More people will have a positive experience of care and support  
Fewer people will suffer avoidable harm  
Fewer people will experience stigma and discrimination  
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concerns have been raised regarding these changes, including the ability of GPs to take on these new 
and very different responsibilities, and the potential for fragmentation due to a new set of boundaries 
and inter-organisational relationships (APPG, 2012). There are also fears that mental health care may 
be more vulnerable due to the majority of funding being tied up in single block contracts which can be 
more easily top-sliced than the payment by activity systems within many physical health services 
(Health Select Committee 2013). There have been attempts to introduce ‘payments by results’ within 
mental health, but these are proving to be extremely complex and the financial regulator has 
questioned if it is feasible or desirable to do so (Lintern, 2013). A new payments system was seen as 
an important step towards further diversifying the market of mental health care. Whilst approximately a 
quarter (26%) of the services purchased by the NHS in 2011/12 are provided by non-statutory (i.e. 
private and third sector) organisations (Mental Health Strategies, 2012), NHS providers continue to 
dominate key service areas such as crisis support, clinical care and community teams. User-held 
budgets are another means through which to introduce market pressures, and whilst take up of direct 
payments has been slower in relation to mental health than other service areas, national evaluations 
highlight that the benefits may in fact be greater (Jones  et al., 2013). 
The Department of Health (DH, 2007) estimated that between 25% and 30% of the 35,000 third 
sector organisations identified in their national mapping exercise work with people with such needs.  
Common services provided were advice, counselling and education, with the third sector also being 
dominant or strong players in advocacy, employment, respite and home support services (Miller 
2013). Beyond their role in direct delivery, TSOs have historically played a significant role in raising 
awareness of the needs of people with mental health problems, in developing and sharing new 
approaches to support, and in campaigning for changes in law and policy (ibid). These roles continue 
to this day, with for example significant involvement in the development of the implementation 
framework for the current national strategy (DH, 2012a) and recent hosting of a major review 
regarding the future of mental health services (MHF, 2013). The potential benefit of involving the third 
sector in both the commissioning process and in service delivery has been underlined within policy 
and guidance. For example, the APPG (2012: 10) stated that ‘The voluntary sector offers a wealth of 
expertise and experience in providing support services alongside the NHS. Often, it is the peer-to-peer 
support offered by voluntary sector organisations that is most desired by service users’. 
Section 2: Data and Methods 
The research proceeded in three main stages. Between late summer and winter 2012 a review of 
academic and policy literature was conducted, summaries of which were published in Miller (2013) 
and Rees (2014). A case study conurbation was identified which incorporated three local authorities. 
In this same period we carried out a small number of key informant interviews with respondents from 
sector bodies, high profile TSOs providing mental health services in the conurbation, and national 
organisations. The aim was to explore initial understandings of the issues and to scope out the 
feasibility of further research into commissioning in the mental health field in the chosen conurbation. 
In particular we identified in broad terms who the most significant commissioning agencies were likely 
to be, namely local authorities through adult social care, Supporting People, and the NHS. 
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In March 2013 we conducted an online survey of third sector organisations involved in the mental 
health field in the conurbation. The main themes explored in the survey were: TSOs’ experience of 
being ‘procured’ by the public sector, their involvement in, and experience of the wider commissioning 
cycle, and their attitudes to the wider application of commissioning and its impact on their 
organisation. Potential respondents were identified through lists or databases of mental health 
organisations held by local infrastructure bodies, discussions with local third sector representative 
bodies and mental health commissioners, and through web searches. The means of contacting them 
varied between different local authorities, which meant that the questionnaire was well targeted but 
also that there was no way of establishing the response rate. The questionnaire was conducted 
entirely online1. The survey received nineteen responses but three were removed from the sample 
because they were discovered to be out of the area or were not in fact responses from organisations, 
leaving sixteen valid organisations and their responses were collated and analysed in a qualitative 
manner due to the small sample. There was a relatively equal split between the number of 
organisations responding in the three local authority areas. Although the sample was not large and did 
not permit any quantitative analysis, the survey was nevertheless very useful in identifying some broad 
experiences of and attitudes to commissioning, further identification of the agencies involved in 
commissioning mental health services, and crucially, provided a core list of TSOs who could be 
approached for further involvement through qualitative interviewing. 
Building on the respondents to the survey a purposive sample of third sector organisations was 
developed which reflected the range of services provided by third sector organisations for people with 
mental health difficulties in the conurbation. These services were primarily: advocacy and 
representation, social care (including domiciliary care, residential care and day activities), supported 
housing, employment, advice, and support for carers. Initially it was thought that the organisations 
would be categorised by the main services that they provided to enable comparison between say a 
housing provider and a social care provider. In reality, reflecting the move to hybridity that is 
commonly reported in relation to the sector, organisations tended to provide a range of services. The 
main exceptions to this were the organisations which provided advocacy support. In view of this and 
the very different role that such organisations play, in the findings sections quotes are therefore 
attributed to TSOs in general or to an advocacy organisation. In the case of commissioners, a generic 
description of their setting within a public sector agency is given. 
Interviews were conducted in the period of early summer 2013 to autumn 2013. The interviews 
covered three main topics: 
• views on the commissioning cycle as well as longer-term relationships with the public sector;  
• experiences of the commissioning cycle as a whole, and more specifically the experience of 
procurement and contracting; as well as the impact of commissioning on organisations; and 
• exploration of respondent’s perception of the impact of commissioning on a range of issues 
including the involvement of users, the specification of outcomes, and the extent to which 
commissioning was joined up between the different public sector service areas. 
1 Using Bristol Online Survey, see www.survey.bris.ac.uk 
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In the cases where interview respondents had previously returned  the questionnaire, their answers to 
the questionnaire were probed in more depth, once this was exhausted conversation was continued 
with the aid of a semi-structured interview schedule. Through the interviews and wider research 
process, we identified key individual commissioners and requested interviews with them. These 
commissioners worked in local authorities or CCGs, and included those from a social care, supporting 
people and general practice background. Interviews were conducted in a similar manner, and in the 
same period, using a revised semi-structured interview schedule. Overall, 23 TSOs were sampled. 
Some interviews involved more than one TSO respondent. Six commissioners were interviewed (one 
was interviewed twice, towards the beginning and towards the end of the fieldwork period). All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed and all of the completed transcripts were read by the 
authors in order to identify a number of key emergent themes. Key data was then entered into a 
spread sheet matrix organised according to the identified themes – allowing systematic analysis of 
groupings within the interview data. The sub-themes were refined through discussion within the 
research team and re-examination of the original data. 
Section 3: Research Findings  
The findings section is structured around the three research questions and the main sub-themes that 
arose in the interviews in response to these.  
3(a) Is commissioning (and procurement and contracting as part of this) different to what went 
before?  
We were interested at the outset in the extent to which respondents (both from TSOs and 
commissioning agencies) felt that commissioning – both as a policy agenda and a specific set of 
processes and practices – had made a real difference to practice on the ground and to inter-
organisational relationships. This focus begged the essential question of whether it was possible to 
discern a ‘before’ and ‘after’ commissioning. First, however, it was clear to us that it was necessary to 
establish the extent of respondents’ understanding of commissioning as a contemporary experience: 
particularly whether people felt that the commissioning cycle was actually achieved in practice. Finally, 
a closely related issue was the extent to which procurement, as a core process within commissioning, 
had been influenced by these wider trends in commissioning practice.                                                  
 
(i) The extent to which the ‘ideal’ commissioning cycle has actually been achieved in practice 
As noted, we questioned respondents about whether they felt the commissioning cycle actually 
operated as the model outlined in Section 1 would suggest. Overall very few reported a belief that 
there was a sense that commissioning operated as a cycle: the general impression was that few 
respondents from TSOs gained a sense from the public sector that it did, or should operate as a cycle. 
Many suggested instead that commissioning felt very disjointed and inchoate, although it was 
acknowledged that this was perhaps due to the strategic nature of commissioning processes, and that 
it was difficult for individuals to gain a strong overview of such relatively long term processes.  
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Of the parts of the cycle that did appear to happen, many mentioned consultation of different forms, 
although they were often critical of particular aspects of this, and suggested that more could be done, 
or done better. Certainly, some TSO respondents were clear that they felt valued in this part of the 
relationship with the public sector, and it was a key area where the third sector contributed to service 
development and delivery: 
we do tend to have some input [earlier in the commissioning cycle] because with our 
service… What we do is when we work in an area, we look at a lot, not just advocacy 
service delivery in that area, but we get in all the aspects of that area… So for example, 
there’s a joint strategic needs assessment that’s been circulated for local authority, our 
service users may have some input into that… So, [you look at what the needs are]… 
Then you look at what you’re going to commission. And then you start the commissioning 
cycle. So I think we try to have an input in that consultation process at the start because 
they are statutory services and non-statutory services. (Advocacy TSO) 
A number of TSOs indicated that their role went beyond just being included in consultation and 
providing information about needs and ‘on the ground intelligence’, they also felt that they were part of 
detailed service design, which suggests an endorsement of the possibilities of ‘intelligent 
commissioning’: 
I have been involved… Looking at some of the redesign of services. But that is not 
necessarily because of I’ve been invited – it’s because of just some of the relationship 
that I’ve got with the commissioning team. So, really, that’s why I’ve been involved with 
some of the redesign. But I think it needs to happen from that stage – there needs to be 
more involvement from the third sector organisation. (TSO) 
However, as this quote suggests, even here a doubt was expressed that commissioning worked in 
quite the ‘technocratic’ (and transparent, market-based) way envisaged, instead long-running personal 
relationships were also a crucial factor. We heard this many times and explore it in more detail below. 
It appeared that in the view of the participants that consultation had been stronger in particular 
specialised fields within the mental health arena and in the commissioning of particular projects. 
Examples included instances where specific services had been re-provided and re-designed and 
TSOs were positive about the careful consultation and dialogue that commissioners had engaged in. 
Some participants also suggested that historical experience of Supporting People commissioning was 
very positive in this regard. Equally, it was made clear that such positive experiences were not 
generally the case and that the different elements of the cycle were often not joined up. Similarly the 
majority view was that commissioning did not always operate in a transparent manner in which all 
stakeholders contributed to and were clear about the strategic plan. Rather, many respondents gave 
the impression of being ‘in the dark’ and somewhat remote from the commissioning process and the 
resultant decisions. Many TSO respondents reported frustrations including times when messages 
came from the public sector that certain things would happen, followed by long delays and uncertainty, 
contributing to a feeling of broken promises. At the same time, TSOs could recognise that many of 
these delays could be explained by the complexity and uncertainty (particularly with shifting or 
uncertain funding) – but it seemed to have introduced a lack of trust, or wariness into the relationship. 
Again, the reasons for this are explored in more detail below. 
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Interestingly, in contrast with the national guidance, most commissioners acknowledged that they 
did not always  regard commissioning as having to operate as a formal cycle. Instead, the reality was 
a rather more complex and dynamic process of interaction in which elements such as consultation 
were included throughout:  
so we have been very much assessing what we’ve already got; understanding what’s 
good quality and what isn’t... we are absolutely convinced that patients involved at all 
levels of commissioning is a really, really good thing and will be better for the public in 
every way. We have made that as a value principle as a CCG and we are trying to do that 
more and more. Yes it takes time and yes you’ve got to get the right people involved, but 
for us we hold that as a strong principle.... (Health commissioner) 
Another finding was that feedback mechanisms and channels for dialogue occur through a wide 
variety of ways that would not necessarily be regarded as part of commissioning. These include 
through the contract management process and a wide range of institutional settings such as 
partnership boards, forums and user groups, and finally the importance of lynchpin individuals are 
important channels of communication between the public sector and TSOs. 
Another consideration in relation to the commissioning cycle is that there are multiple such ‘cycles’ 
in operation at any one time. These operate at different levels (i.e. population, locality, and individual), 
within sub-fields related to policy areas and/or needs, and in relation to the retendering of specific 
services: 
you need a cycle, there’s a lifetime for the contract from the point of view that the way 
that the NHS and the council are looking at services that’s changing quite fundamentally 
at the moment so we need to be able to say we now will procure organisations that will 
carry out  these functions for us.  But that doesn’t mean to say that there’s only one 
commissioning cycle, there are a number of different cycles that go on. (LA 
commissioner) 
There was, though, at least one example of an overall ‘cyclical’ process being explicitly followed to 
develop the local commissioning strategy, with considerable effort being taken to engage people 
accessing services from the outset and to use their views to shape the subsequent delivery models 
and specifications. From the perspective of the commissioner this was radically different to previous 
commissioning approaches: 
 
we are designing services that can meet needs, so we have listened and we have heard, we 
have looked at what services we are going to do, and now we are actually designing them, to 
see if we can actually meet needs. It is a complete change. (CCG commissioning manager) 
 
For this commissioner this emphasis on engagement of people accessing services arose out of the 
‘value base’ that had been agreed within their CCG, highlighting for them the potential for local bodies 
to shape what commissioning looks like in practice.                                                                                 
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(ii) Is commissioning different to what went before? 
If there was doubt over whether the commissioning cycle operated in practice, there was also 
considerable diversity of opinion as to whether a real break could be identified between a period 
where commissioning was in operation and a time before. On the one hand, most of the organisations 
had long-standing funding relationships with particular elements of the public sector and so whilst the 
processes may have changed the core basis (i.e. that public sector funds the third sector to support  
people) was continued: 
and I know it’s changing, isn’t it, from grants to contracts and things, however, whether 
it’s a grant or a contract, you still have to be paid, and it’s always late. (TSO) 
Building on this financial connection many pointed out that their organisations had been working with 
the public sector more broadly for many years. As one commented: 
if you go back, we had very positive relationships with what weren’t called commissioners 
then, in the 80s.  [I say positive], because you’d be part of the bigger committee and 
discuss that you put proposals forward, bids, or where there are such developed 
services. So for a lot of years we had a very positive relationship... I mean the issue is 
quite complicated isn’t it, in terms of when the commissioning actually replaced what was 
there before, because there’s all the overlap is there in terms of contracts and… [there is 
doubt, therefore] I think, whether commissioning actually is that different... (TSO, 
emphasis added). 
Others suggested that at the same time as there being this evidence of strong continuities with past 
approaches, it was possible to identify a clear difference and that was linked to a growing sense of a 
clearer steer coming from the public sector that a more rigorous commissioning approach and 
commissioning cycle was being implemented. There was a sense in which commissioning had 
heralded a more professional and co-ordinated approach to planning, purchasing and providing: 
the difference probably is, and it’s a good difference, is that whoever is commissioning 
the services are now tightening up on their monitoring and evaluation procedures, which 
they should’ve done in the first place basically. I’ve been in a really weird position of 
having to ask… people who commission services from us to provide targets, to provide 
monitoring outcomes basically, and it’s been a long time coming. And I think people are 
getting their act together now but it’s ridiculous that the people who provide the services 
are having to ask for that. (TSO, emphasis added) 
As we have already noted, this picture was not consistent across all geographical areas and all public 
sector agencies. However, many also reported that the public sector now had a better awareness of 
what money they were actually spending and were therefore able to review how it was being used: 
it was only a couple of years ago when the commissioners, who as I say have got their 
act together, were, sort of like, “Oh, we’re paying for a recovery worker, what’s all that 
about?”  We’re like, “Well, you’ve been paying it to us for the last ten years and we’ve 
been delivering on it, and we’ve been providing you with monitoring information on it.”  
….it took them a long time as well to figure out what they were paying for and then to, 
sort of, remodel it.’ (TSO) 
For many, their experience of commissioning was consistent with their experience of the general 
interface with the public sector, that is, of complexity, opacity and inconsistency of communication. 
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Asked if commissioning was different to what went before, one TSO replied: 
I’m thinking, I’m not actually sure. Outwardly, because the structure’s different in terms of 
the commissioning teams and the people who are responsible for commissioning in 
specific areas, I think that all looks different. However, the way that it’s actually done and 
the way that services are procured, I don’t think it has changed that much, to be honest. 
… in my experience in working with commissioners, they seem to work in quite an erratic 
way. (Advocacy TSO) 
Linking to the point made above regarding TSOs’ perspective of the existence of a ‘commissioning 
cycle’ many participants found it difficult to reflect if commissioning was different to what had come 
before as they felt disconnected from the process, with a lack of information and awareness of how 
commissioners operate. Others seemed to have a more detailed knowledge about the changes that 
had happened within the relevant part of the public sector in relation to the development of a 
commissioning approach. However, this illustrates that it appears to depend very much on individual 
experience and exactly who – both in terms of the agency and the individual officer concerned – was 
involved in commissioning the service. And again this highlights the importance of inter-organisational 
networking and personal relationships. 
One TSO respondent felt that there were clearly continuities in terms of the long-running nature of 
contracts they held with the public sector; and they acknowledged that in the past some 
commissioning relationships had perhaps been a bit too ‘cosy’ and based on personal relationships 
and the maintenance of a status quo. But they felt equally strongly that commissioning – and arguably 
more specifically the procurement process – had now gone too far the other way: becoming too 
'clinical' and ‘dehumanised’. This seemed to be summed up by the move to procurement often being 
conducted online. Numerous respondents complained about decisions being based on the strict and 
inflexible application of ‘tick box’ approaches, rather than the more flexible and informal approaches 
experienced in the past.  
Drawing some of this (admittedly very diverse) experience together, a clear overall finding was the 
sense of considerable underlying continuity – not least because many had contracts that had been 
‘rolled over’ for many years, or had continued to be re-commissioned in some way; and that close, 
seemingly co-dependent relationships had developed between the public and third sectors. Where 
difference was identified this was largely in relation to the procurement and contracting element of the 
cycle rather than, for instance, in the needs analysis and service redesign elements. This was joined 
by considerable difficulty in identifying real evidence of a significant shift in the practice of 
commissioning and in the shift from one ‘mode’ to another.  
Many commissioners had an interesting perspective on these issues. On the whole they confirmed 
the finding that there was a significant degree of historical continuity. But they also tended to argue 
that commissioning had ushered in a much more rigorous approach focused on systemic service 
improvement; indeed they argued it had become less ‘tick boxy’ over time: 
I think it has moved from a more contractual type relationship and arrangement to much 
more of a – what I would say is a stock commissioning response in terms of you know 
that really having everything driven by your Joint Strategic Needs Assessment, you know 
the sort of engagement with service users and carers is much more second nature now 
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than perhaps it used to be.  If you know – you have to – you would struggle to justify not 
involving service users and carers now in any of your sort of planning and commissioning 
processes.... (LA Commissioner, emphasis added) 
And that this was linked to a much more rigorous approach to performance management and 
effectively building a cycle approach to commissioning: 
I think we’re getting more sophisticated than that because the information’s getting better.  
In the past you know trying to get any mental health information was just an absolute 
nightmare. You know, you couldn’t rely on it, it was never reconciled, it was never 
validated, you know a lot of it was paper records, a lot of it wasn’t put on in a timely way. 
It was really difficult to have reliable information that you could – you could base your 
work on, so I think hence why it was much more of a historical, contract sort of basis 
relationship that, “You keep underperforming on this so we’ll take money out” (emphasis 
added). (LA Commissioner) 
It is perhaps unsurprising that commissioners could clearly articulate an aspiration and ambition for 
how commissioning should be conducted, while TSOs ‘on the ground’ perceived a more complex and 
problematic reality.  
Finally it is worth noting that commissioning is evolving over time. This appeared to be in part due 
to the public sector developing its competence in some aspects of the cycle (although see section 
below) but also due to the change in policy requirements about who should be involved in the process. 
In the mental health sector, the move to Clinical Commissioning Groups and the role of GPs as overall 
leaders was understandably flagged up in particular. At the time of the research CCGs were still 
bedding in, and therefore the impact for TSOs had been minimal. The commissioners were starting to 
notice the difference this could make – whilst it was too early a stage to provide any meaningful 
comment on what this would be, the move was seen (by commissioners) as a positive one in principle: 
what we’re going to be doing is looking at reviewing all of those services then being able 
to say to the GPs “This is what we’ve got at the moment, you tell us what are the gaps 
there or how we might do things differently” so that when we come to re-procure those 
services we can have something that’s very clinically led and therefore will be much more 
attuned to the kinds of problems that they’re being asked to cope with in their surgeries. 
So that’s a much better way of doing it. (LA Commissioner) 
(iii) Procurement and contracting: is procurement different under commissioning? 
As outlined already, most participants reported the process through which funding was transferred 
from the public sector to the third sector had changed over recent years, even if this change could not 
be convincingly ascribed to the advent of commissioning. This was usually described as a change 
from ‘grant’ based mechanisms to those based on ‘contractual’ processes. Whilst there was a lack of 
clarity about what was meant by a ‘grant’ or a ‘contract’, the latter was usually connected with a more 
competitive process that was more specific about the purpose of the funding and how performance 
would be monitored: 
even though they’re on a contract, believe that they have a grant. …And so therefore are 
still operating on the, “We don’t really have to tell you anything because it’s a grant” and 
we’re saying, “No it’s a contract”. (LA Commissioner) 
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what’s changed is how things are actually procured.  There’s certainly been a shift from 
grants to more formalised tendering processes. (TSO) 
For a few TSO participants the previous grant based system was seen as being preferable. Reasons 
given for this included: a less cumbersome process to gain funding, more certainty about what funding 
would be provided, and fewer conditions connected with the award of a grant. These were seen as 
requiring TSOs to spend less time and energy in pursuing potential funding pots and therefore 
enabling them to focus primarily on how to respond to the needs of their beneficiaries: 
I suppose the difference is when you’re actually trying to get them because the hoops you 
have to jump through for a contract are far worse and then you usually have to go and do 
a presentation, whereas for a grant you fill in what’s probably not a too demanding form. 
(TSO) 
so in the good old days we used to have block contracts for both outreach services and 
for accommodation-based services and we knew what we’d got to spend, we staffed up 
to the maximum that we could. (TSO) 
In contrast with much previous research, the majority (but not all) of participants could though identify 
positives in this perceived shift in procurement practice. In part these were centred around their 
observation that previously the public sector had not been sufficiently diligent with how it had used its 
available funding. This translated into services being continued that were potentially not the most 
efficient or beneficial approach to achieve an outcome and similarly providers who may not have been 
best placed to deliver a service being guaranteed that they would carry on doing so: 
we were in danger of some services just being re-commissioned and re-commissioned 
and re-commissioned without much thought going into are these clients actually 
achieving long-term outcomes from using this service. So I think the change from grants 
to contracts is a good thing. (TSO) 
a lot of the contracts or a lot of the things being delivered have been delivered for years; 
in my words, “Pet projects of commissioners”.  But essentially, they hadn’t got a grasp of 
what they were paying for. (TSO) 
Alongside a better targeting of the available funding, the move to ‘contractual’ arrangements was 
connected with more accountability for TSOs in how the resources were used. This was largely 
through tighter performance management reporting. On the whole this was again welcomed on the 
basis that it would help to ensure that money was being used effectively, and also that TSOs would be 
able to evidence the impact of what they had delivered (which in turn would make it more likely that 
they would continue to receive funding): 
the difference probably is, and it’s a good difference, is that whoever is commissioning 
the services are now tightening up on their monitoring and evaluation procedures, which 
they should’ve done in the first place basically. (TSO) 
An interesting issue that was raised by a few participants was the extent to which the third sector had 
been willing to go along with the previous regime and its more lax arrangements. They described 
some TSOs as having not always having adequately scoped what they had proposed to 
commissioners, and that the void in relation to performance monitoring potentially led TSOs to be less 
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focused and efficient. These views would suggest the rigour provided by a more engaged 
procurement process is beneficial to TSOs as it provides an additional challenge to the stewardship of 
their resources: 
I think some of the historic contracts that I’ve seen were bloody stupid at the outset; what 
on earth possessed us to suggest it and what on earth possessed the commissioners to 
buy it, in terms of the nature of the service and the cost of it? (TSO) 
too often we get complacent and we deliver something that’s comfortable and not 
necessarily what people want. (TSO) 
The TSOs who provided social care support reported a further move in procurement from block 
contracts with the local authority to individual purchasing arrangements with the person accessing the 
service. This was less pronounced than would probably be the case with other adult service user 
groups in which personalised budgets are better embedded. There were mixed perspectives on this 
shift to more personalised funding mechanisms. Positive views included the additional flexibility that it 
provided as TSOs could negotiate directly with the individual rather than having to go back to a 
commissioner or care manager to seek approval, and a support for the underlying principles behind 
the policy: 
personalisation has made commissioners think, you know, just because you’re in that 
commissioning situation doesn’t mean, you know, that everything has to be led by you, 
it’s now led by the individual that needs that care and support… it’s more people taking 
control. (TSO) 
Those who were less positive were principally worried about the financial instability that could result 
from personal budgets in comparison to the guaranteed annual income that was provided through a 
block contract arrangement. Such financial concerns were also raised in relation to payment 
mechanisms in which providers were funded for delivering activities or outcomes in respect of 
individuals: 
I think that they won’t have charities engaging because they won’t be able to do it, they 
won’t be able to fund it. Most charities can’t fund it upfront from the staff costs. (TSO) 
Financial insecurity aside, being paid for achieving positive outcomes was seen as having 
considerable potential for the third sector. This was on the basis that the TSO participants believed 
that they were providing a more holistic service than the public or private sectors, and were therefore 
in a better position to take advantage of such payment mechanisms: 
I mean I think the great opportunity it offers for the third sector is again is to have a wider 
role and because, if you pay by results and are genuine outcomes, you are forced to do 
what the third sector I think is intuitively much better than statutory services, is take broad 
view of meeting people’s needs. (TSO) 
As ever the detail within such payment mechanisms was seen as vital in its introduction, and because 
of its clear importance we come back to the issue of outcomes later in the paper. 
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3(b) What are TSOs’ experiences of procurement and contracting under a commissioning 
environment? 
Throughout this research, we were reminded that the financial relationship between commissioner and 
provider organisation is of crucial importance. It was therefore not surprising to consistently find that 
TSOs were most concerned about the performance and functioning of this element of the  
commissioning cycle in particular and interviews rapidly focused on this element in particular. Their 
comments have been themed under three areas of concern for the respondents – tendering (i.e. the 
process of selecting a purchaser for a service), contracting (i.e. the process of formalising what the 
chosen provider will deliver and then monitoring this delivery) and the dynamics of competition within 
these processes. 
 
(i) Tendering 
TSOs and commissioners both agreed that an important pre-requisite of a good tendering process 
was being clear about what was required and the funding that would be available to deliver the service 
and outcomes: 
I think they have to be very clear what it is they want when they’re procuring services, 
which hasn’t always been the case in the past, and organisations have just gone off and 
done what they think is best, but it’s not necessarily always right. So I think there’s two 
things. They need to be clear from the start, when they are procuring new services, what 
they actually want. (TSO) 
Commissioners themselves recognised that this had been an area of weakness in the past, but felt 
that it had improved in recent years: 
I think people get the opportunity to have their say as to what’s being proposed and the 
specification that’s being developed, and that’s all publicly consulted on.  So there is a 
process in place that that is done. (LA commissioner) 
TSOs reported that the approach taken to specifications varied considerably between public bodies 
and localities, suggesting that best practice in such procurement is yet to be established and/or 
adopted across the public sector: 
if I was given a blind trial I would guess that I could tell the difference between authorities 
just by reading where the emphasis lay in the specifications and the amount of detail that 
the different commissioners put out. (TSO) 
Echoing the comments in the previous section, a common frustration related to delays in expected 
tenders being advertised and the uncertainty that this caused for TSOs in relation to developing their 
services (and so the support they could provide to their beneficiaries). There were also concerns from 
a number of participants regarding the advertising of tenders, with once again the smaller 
organisations finding greater difficulty due to their lack of internal capacity to keep abreast of what 
tenders were being released: 
it doesn’t really advertise well what tenders are up or what are coming up. So by the time 
some people hear about the tender, it’s… Or if you’re not constantly logging on, you 
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haven’t got staff just dedicated to look at this website all the time to see what tenders are 
coming up, easily missed, definitely, for smaller organisations as well. (TSO) 
Communication was repeatedly a source of frustration in relation to the outcome of tendering 
processes, with one TSO having to chase repeatedly before an answer was provided and another 
being erroneously told that they had been awarded a sum of money which was then significantly 
reduced: 
we didn’t hear anything for a while, so we were trying to make contact with the 
commissioners and we didn’t hear anything. And then they informed us in writing, but 
only after we’d tried really, really hard to get some sort of correspondence. They aborted 
the tender process because of some illegality that they had not been adhering to the 
correct protocol, so the tender process was aborted. (TSO) 
first they sent us a ridiculous letter saying we’d been awarded [£X amount] a year, the 
next day they emailed saying, “Oh, we’ve sent you the wrong letter”. …So then they sent 
us another letter saying actually we’d been awarded [£Y amount] which was quite a bit 
less than our previous grant. (TSO) 
There were calls from some respondents that smaller TSOs should be given additional support to 
ensure that they were aware of what was available, but this did lead to concerns from commissioners 
that they could be seen to fall foul of the rules that they must not discriminate for or against any type of 
provider: 
the thing is you can’t show preferential treatment.  You can’t say “Oh, you provided this 
so we’ll keep you in the loop.  We’ll let you know when it’s going to happen”.  Otherwise 
everybody has to have the same. … Whoever they are should be able to get all the 
documents, so I don’t really accept the argument that people don’t know. (LA 
commissioner) 
That said, support was provided in most areas to enable the third sector to be in a better position to 
apply for tenders through the work of infrastructure bodies. One CCG also highlighted that they 
provided information and engagement opportunities for the third sector in particular – 
we also support the voluntary sector with joint education and training. There is a monthly open 
mike forum, which they come to, anyone can come to, anyone can attend, and can ask 
questions and we have themes. (CCG commissioning manager) 
 
Tendering was also seen by some as a means to have assurance at least in the medium term about 
what funding would be provided to them, and this was compared favourably to scenarios in which a 
grant was renewed on a short-term basis whilst longer-term decisions regarding commissioning 
priorities were made: 
even if ultimately the commissioning process doesn’t favour us, I think it would be a 
positive step that everything is firmed up because it’s been like walking in quick sand, 
certainly the last eighteen months. And it takes its toll on morale, staff morale, they don’t 
know whether they are coming or going. (TSO)  
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Contracts did not however remove altogether the lack of certainty regarding funding, as they also 
appeared at times to be renewed on a temporary basis whilst the commissioner considered the 
options and funding available: 
I’ve currently got about four different extensions on the go from the local authority, 
because they are just slowly getting their acts together, aren’t they?  The situation we’re 
at at the moment is that we are uncertain beyond September whether we’ve got any NHS 
work under contract. (TSO)  
it was only the last week of March that we heard that one of our NHS subcontracts was 
being rolled over for a year so we just had to leave staff, we couldn’t put their jobs at risk, 
but people kept saying, “Oh it’s going to be rolled over,” so we decided it was better to 
trust that, but it wasn’t ‘til the last minute we actually got that in writing. (TSO) 
There were still examples (in the view of respondents) of a more open approach not being deployed, 
and these were perceived negatively (at least by TSOs that were not beneficiaries of such an 
approach) as they denied the opportunity for them to demonstrate what they could offer: 
it seems to be where you’ve got a good provider who’s doing the job, it kind of just… rolls 
on, and rolls on, and rolls on. (TSO) 
there’s this closed group of providers and they keep having their contracts rolled 
over.(TSO)  
Furthermore regular tendering was also described by some participants as preventing their 
organisations from taking a long term view which could potentially enable them to better support more 
disadvantaged communities. This was seen as being a misplaced belief by commissioners that they 
always had to put services out to tender: 
that’s businesses; that’s where the business acumen comes in to play.  But we can’t get 
that message across to them. And under EEC law they don’t even have to go to 
procurement, they could develop partnerships and frameworks where they’re constantly 
working to evolve and grow the quality of the services that are delivered. But whatever is 
in their heads they would rather spend millions of pounds going through a procurement 
exercise than actually saying “No, let’s do a framework and let’s work with a select 
number of providers to deliver our services for the future.”(TSO) 
 
(ii) Contracting 
Having awarded the tender the procurer of the service has to then issue a contract setting out what 
will be expected of the provider. For a number of TSOs, simply getting a copy of their contract 
appeared to be a challenge in itself: 
it’s still sometimes all too difficult to finish off with a commissioner the niceties of 
contractual agreements and other things and so it can be hard work getting proper 
documentation about contracts that you’re commissioned to provide. (TSO) 
A common issue raised was the tendency of health bodies to use the standard NHS contract rather 
than the service level agreements that had been used previously. The standard contract was seen to 
be overly detailed and demanding and more suitable to the letting of large contracts with bigger 
organisations than with smaller TSOs. This was linked for some respondents to the lack of flexibility 
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and bureaucracy they had experienced in the tendering process. Contracts which involved more than 
one agency were seen as particularly complex: 
some of these services are delivered by very small organisations and a 140 page 
contract, that includes requirements that most – many organisations won’t have an 
understanding about, seems inappropriate and inflexible on the part of the commissioner. 
(TSO)  
when you see some of the contracts, the multilateral contracts that come out… It was 
different when it was Service Level Agreements – it was based on what was agreed there 
and then with your organisation, what you’re going to do, what we’re going to do. But then 
the multilateral contracts came out, which is one standard contract, and as you get 
different services come in, then they just update that contract – so add another bit in, add 
another bit in. Some of the jargon that’s in there! (TSO) 
Monitoring of contracts was described as often being more based on quantitative measurements of 
service uptake rather than capturing the experience of people who were supported. This was seen to 
reflect a ‘hands off’ approach by commissioners in relation to the contracted services and several 
participants expressed a wish for greater engagement and more robust and holistic monitoring 
processes: 
we used to have shared values, good communication on service users’ needs and a joint 
understanding of local service delivery and now it is a contract that could just as easily be 
in regards to refuse collection. (TSO, Survey Response) 
we were commissioned by both the PCT and the Trust, we had very little contact with 
either of them, maybe quarterly they’d just ask us to send some stats in, etc, etc, and that 
was fine, and to some degree you think, “great, leave us to get on with what we’re doing.  
Brilliant,” but I think there also has to be an element of responsibility and accountability. 
(TSO) 
they’re very used to quantitative targets, if you know what I mean, and giving you 
numbers and number-crunching and all this sort of thing, but they don’t pay attention to 
the soft outcomes and they don’t pay attention to the amount of time that it takes for 
people like support workers, for example, to have to deal with a case, and every case is 
different. (TSO)  
Commissioners recognised the importance of thorough contract monitoring, but struggled to achieve 
this in practice due to both capacity and expertise. They reported differing experiences of the 
willingness of TSOs to engage with such processes, with examples of TSOs resisting attempts for 
more robust frameworks but also those in which TSOs had been pro-active in opening up the 
possibility of more holistic approaches and engaging people who access services in the reporting 
mechanism: 
there’s a combination in terms of commissioning you’ve got to really have that sort of 
level of discipline to have both sides in it.  You can’t just give me a verbal update; we’ve 
got to have that evidence of what they’ve done and all the rest of it.  So yes, it’s a 
combination of things really. (LA Commissioner) 
they’ve had patients come to their six monthly review meetings presenting their view of 
the service and why we should continue it or adapt it accordingly.  Never before have I 
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entered a contract negotiation meeting, where the patient has led the meeting. Now that’s 
impressive. (CCG Lead) 
These comments also highlight that in some times and in some places, elements of the ‘ideal’ 
commissioning cycle clearly can and do operate, and that there are aspects of ‘good practice’ 
happening in the system. 
 
(iii) Dynamics of competition and collaboration 
As highlighted above a more competitive and open process to allocation of funding has been 
introduced as part of the move to a commissioning approach. As mentioned above there is no legal or 
policy requirement that commissioners will deploy competitive approaches to the awarding of all 
grants and contracts, but there is an expectation that they will consider all the potential procurement 
options and be able to justify why a grant or contract was rolled over or newly allocated to a single 
organisation rather than being put out to tender. Commissioners suggested that they did try to deploy 
the mechanism that they saw as most appropriate for the service in question, and this included 
working developmentally with one organisation if they were seen as being uniquely placed to respond 
to the identified need: 
you can’t tender everything all at the same time anyway so I think it’s got to be a process 
where new services come in and the way that we tender them, the way that we specify 
them, that’s going to change; that’s where we can do a lot I think and we can influence 
what’s being provided. (LA Commissioner) 
And as a commissioner in a different authority noted: 
we again went formally through the single provider route to procurement because actually 
what we wanted to do was ensure that we’ve got the same providers so that actually the 
capacity across the localities could be flexed according to where the needs were 
presenting. (LA Commissioner)  
Reflecting the positive comments regarding the move to a more ‘contractual’ approach, there was 
support from many TSOs regarding the opening up of funding opportunities to other organisations 
rather than an existing recipient being supported ad infinitum, and also as opening the door to new 
ways of working. This was described as having benefits in terms of a better use of public sector 
funding. But equally for TSOs it was seen as a positive move that enabled them to provide new 
service offers in line with their overall mission and to achieve greater economies of scale/scope 
through increasing the range of services and/or the areas in which they worked: 
it probably has opened up more things for us being able to do than we might have done 
in the past, so I think when you had grant, sort of grant sort of based regime of doing 
things, I think it limited the third sector to doing, a quite narrow niche of activities which 
were, on the whole, to the periphery of things. (TSO) 
 it’s quite positive in some ways because we’re an organisation that does all of the 
services, we’ve got a potential opportunity there, to, you know, be the sort of, the single 
provider of all the services in one area.  And that’s good for a third sector organisation 
because by doing that, you can have more stability.  You can improve some of your 
infrastructure, you can identify economies of scale yourself internally. (Advocacy TSO)  
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Competitive tendering was still a source of considerable anxiety for a number of the respondents, as it 
had or may in future lead to the funding for their TSO being lost. This was particularly the case for 
smaller organisations, who were concerned that they would not have the infrastructure, capacity or 
business skills to compete against larger third sector, private or NHS organisations: 
you’re not as good as this all singing, all dancing bid that’s coming in. And I think the 
commissioners need to understand where you’re coming from when you’re doing that bid 
when you’re not a big organisation maybe. They can’t treat everybody the same, can 
they? (TSO) 
we’re very good at the grass roots level work and require us to get some good results, but 
we’re not good at doing the business end and building the key relationships, marketing 
what we do, selling what we do.  We don’t have the resources.  We’ve never built that 
kind of skill-set within particularly small organisations. (TSO) 
Competition had also opened up the local market to a greater variety of providers, with several TSOs 
describing their main rivals as increasingly being from the private rather than third sector. Whilst 
commissioners largely valued the characteristics often seen to be connected with the third sector their 
primary interest was in purchasing from an organisation that could deliver what they required rather 
than the sector it came from: 
some of those organisations have developed into provider organisations now, so you’d 
have to say “Well, we wouldn’t treat them any differently to a private company or indeed 
an in-house service” but what we’d want to know is: is that providing a good quality 
service; have we got something that can tell us that; is it providing it at a cost that we’re 
willing to pay.  And so as long as someone provides the right service for the right person 
at the right price it’s not for us to judge as to whether they happen to be registered with 
the Charity Commission or floating on the stock exchange, it’s our job to concentrate on 
the person who’s receiving the service.’ (Joint Commissioner) 
 
‘Framework agreements’ (from which people accessing services would individually select a provider 
through their personal budgets) were seen as having benefits in this regard, as it was less onerous for 
smaller organisations to apply and they were then competing through ‘user choice’ rather than for a 
single large contract. Other TSOs were more confident in both competing for business and also in 
undertaking relationship building with commissioners as a way of ‘soft selling’ to commissioners. The 
latter approach had led to TSOs being allocated new funding without going through competitive 
processes, and those TSOs were happy to receive this (despite the general support for greater 
transparency in how funding was allocated): 
I managed to narrow down who the person was, who the lead was.  She then got me into 
their re-provision meetings, she then said, “Okay, next residential unit that closes we’re 
going to give it to…” (TSO) 
Strategies deployed by TSOs to win additional funding without a tendering process included piloting a 
service through their own resources and then using the evidence of its impact to convince a 
commissioner that it should be picked up by the public sector, or proposing how a commissioner could 
meet a new legal responsibility: 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
I wrote a paper saying this will be the effect and this is what I’ll need to do it and that went 
through to the Health Commissioners and also the Local Authority Commissioners and 
they granted the money and the contract… (Advocacy TSO) 
A positive relationship with a commissioner was also described as enabling flexibility within a contract 
so that the resources could be used in a different way, and/or providing the opportunity to gradually 
add more services over time: 
we then went back to ... and said, “Look, this is what’s happening, these are the sort of 
people we’ve got in this house and we also see the merits for a floating support service, 
so can we talk about that?”  And so we did and we came up with the idea that... you 
know, she said, “Well you’ve got these hours, we really can’t sort of commission any 
more hours but if you want to we will agree that you can use excess hours. (TSO) 
In one locality the local NHS Foundation Trust had been delegated responsibility to procure a range of 
services on behalf of the commissioner. This was seen as a less satisfactory arrangement due to the 
potential that the Foundation Trust may be looking for evidence that they were better placed to deliver 
the service, in contrast with a commissioner whose role was solely to purchase and would therefore 
not have a blurring of interests. Furthermore, as the Foundation Trust controlled the allocation of 
activity they were seen as being in a position to potentially distort this in their own interests: 
you work under a dilemma of outlook where you think that if we don’t do it better, more 
than likely, when they are contracting out again, they will not contract the third sector. 
(TSO) 
the referral numbers are down because we’re in that slightly perverse position I think 
whilst the foundation trust are contracting to us to deliver work, it’s the same work they 
are doing, so it’s almost like we are in competition. So, of course, they are going to take 
referrals for themselves first to keep their numbers up and then we tend to get from the 
NHS whatever is left. (TSO) 
In many respects the participants concerned understood why there would be a pressure on the 
Foundation Trust to behave in such a manner, and there was a sense that this purchasing role had 
been forced upon them rather than being something that they would have chosen to adopt. 
 
3(c) What factors appear to influence the positive implementation of commissioning (and in 
particular procurement and contracting)? 
In this section we consider the key ingredients that appear to have influenced the way that TSOs have 
experienced commissioning and which from their perspective at least can be seen as contributing to 
the successful realisation of the commissioning process. It focuses less on the nuts and bolts of 
procurement, or on problems and barriers, and instead on some of the issues that seem to be 
universal to the (relatively) successful implementation of commissioning.  Each one also represents an 
important area in which policies have been addressed to improve particular aspects of the 
commissioning functions of public bodies, notably the desire to improve the skills and capacity of 
commissioning staff and the general commitment to improved coordination and information sharing 
between different public sector agencies. 
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(i) The quality of personal relationships  
A wide range of respondents consistently highlighted the importance not just of personal relationships 
but also their longevity, not least because it clearly takes time for trust to develop between public 
sector commissioners and individual TSOs. Despite the move to more formality in funding processes, 
most TSO participants emphasised the importance of their relationship with the commissioning 
organisations, and more specifically their relationship with key players within the commissioning 
process:  
the relationships are important… the director took a particular interest in our mental 
health, so we built up this good relationship with him... with the authority, I should say. 
(TSO) 
I spoke to somebody else and they said, “You’ve actually met the commissioner?” and I 
said, “Yes, she’s really nice, she’s really got an open door policy and if you’ve got 
something to say then contact her”.  So I was pleased that she was able to enter into that 
dialogue. (TSO) 
A positive relationship with the individual commissioners was seen as an important element of 
developing trust between the organisations. This in turn opened up the possibility of greater flexibility 
from both parties in what was delivered within a contract, and more informal sharing of ideas and 
gaps. An established relationship meant that commissioning decisions to put out a current service to 
tender could be more easily accepted, although a commitment to continue investment was clearly 
welcomed: 
a lot of decisions are made face to face; I think commissioning is often about, it’s about 
people, it’s about having those relationships. (TSO) 
our relationship with the commissioners has been sufficiently strong for us to say pretty 
much what we want to say. She’s lovely, lovely, and I mean, she’s as straight as a 
die…she said to me basically, you know, in 2014 we’re going to have to be looking at all 
advocacy services with a view to tender. Well, okay, fine. (Advocacy TSO) 
the recognition of our efforts to fund new services over the years by bringing in funding 
such as lottery has been acknowledged and when this funding ends they have tried to 
pick up the costs - even at this difficult time - as they recognise the value of the service 
we have developed and how it fits in with local agendas e.g. advocacy, healthy living 
working with people who have experienced domestic abuse etc. (TSO, Survey 
Response) 
Being a part of the third sector was reported by TSOs as being positively responded to by 
commissioners, in part because they believed there was a shared value base and also for those who 
had been working in a locality for an extended period because they had an established track record of 
delivering what was required (although as mentioned this did not mean that TSOs would be 
necessarily be favoured in the tendering processes). Nevertheless, relationships were often seen as 
crucial to the achievement of particular funding and service outcomes: 
because the overriding factor for me with all of this commissioning, year after year after 
year, is that the commissioners will come to us as a third sector body... okay, so they sort 
of like us, it’s easier to deal with us than it is with a for-profit organisation… (TSO) 
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The local dimension was reflected by one of the commissioners in particular: 
I always worry that it could be so much easier to get a national contract couldn’t it, with 
MacMillan and say, “Okay, can you provide this service?” and it’s done nationally. But 
actually I probably might lose all the nuances of our area in that and the one thing that the 
third sector brings, far more than anyone else – anything else – is that local experience.  I 
really, really, really want that.  I want you to know about the little wood that you can go 
walking in, I want you to know about the shop keeper who is more friendly to the people 
with Downs Syndrome. (CCG Lead, emphasis added) 
As the discussion in earlier sections showed, many could acknowledge that such personal 
relationships might be seen as having a dark side in the risk of complacency and a ‘closed shop’ of 
providers. For many, this close working relationship between the public sector and the third sector was 
justified by the added value that the latter were seen to bring: the experience and the expertise on the 
ground that the commissioner couldn’t gain on its own. This sometimes amounted to a real sense of 
inter-dependency: the same TSO quoted just above described asking commissioners for strategic 
guidance for the future, and was surprised that: 
the answer always comes back, “Well we don’t really know, what do you think?”  And I 
don’t think that I’m simplifying it, on occasion it has been as blunt as that, “Well how do 
we get out of this mess?”  So we are proud of the relationship that we’ve nurtured locally 
but if we can’t nurture a good relationship like that then there’s something wrong with us; 
we’re local, we’re community-based, we’re third sector, we’re not-for-profit, you know, our 
interest is [this local authority area] and we’ve been here a bloody long time.  So if we 
play the game right then we should be expected to have a good working relationship. 
(TSO) 
Naturally as one might expect with a close and longstanding relationship, communication problems 
can sometimes be an issue. Other more negative experiences included one smaller TSO highlighting 
their perspective that smaller TSOs were not treated equally to the larger organisations: 
I think they treat the third sector with disdain, really. They don’t prioritise the third sector, 
unless, of course, you are a large third sector….. you’re large and cumbersome and quite 
bureaucratic, much like their organisation, and they seem quite happy to deal with those 
third sector organisations more speedily, more readily than small to medium-sized ones. 
(TSO) 
One of the downsides of the centrality of individual relationships to the commissioning process 
appeared to be the fragility of such personal arrangements. Whilst many of the TSO participants had 
been working in the organisation and locality for a considerable period, there appeared to be 
considerable instability in commissioners. This was in part due to individuals seeking promotion or 
other opportunities, but most commonly mentioned was the disruption caused by regular restructuring 
within public sector organisations and/or in the public sector system as whole. This is discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 
 
(ii) Public sector competence 
Recent Government policy has encouraged a focus on improving the skills and capacity of 
commissioners and enhancing the professional standing of the role. This focus appears justified given 
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the very considerable range of comments from respondents regarding the significant difference that 
individuals make to the success or otherwise of the commissioning function. There was considerable 
nuance in the way that TSOs thought of commissioners, with both positive and negative assessments 
of the abilities and capacity of individual commissioners: 
I’m also struck at the moment by just how much individual members of staff make a 
difference. We’ve gone through – we’re on our third contract manager for this work. First 
one was completely relaxed, second one wanted to tighten up a little bit, this third one 
has an intent to tighten up at some point in the future. But it just seems to come from 
partly their workload, partly – I don’t think they are clear on what the expectations are. 
(TSO) 
The approach taken by a commissioner in relation to procurement was thought to relate to their 
individual knowledge, skills and perspective, with some participants questioning the ability of those in 
commissioning roles to undertake such tasks: 
if I’m totally honest I think some commissioners – it’s not personal or anything like that – 
some commissioners moved into positions rather than having the training or experience. 
(TSO) 
Commissioners recognised the complexity involved in procurement and contracting, with some of 
them being candid about their own confidence and the capacity of their organisations to respond 
sufficiently to these demands: 
contracting is a very, very specialist skill.  You know I as a commissioner have not got the 
contracting nous or the legal knowledge....You know, that’s one of the big difficulties. You 
need proper contracting capacity to be able to deliver those. (LA Commissioner) 
I’ve got something like 150 contracts with third sector organisations. It’s an absolute 
nightmare to manage. So getting the CSU to manage them is really, really hard. And 
there’s a set of quality standards and a set of outcomes and you know, “Should we put in 
CQUINs into all of these?” And you know who the hell is going to do that? I haven’t got a 
team that can do that at all. It’s an absolute nightmare. (CCG Lead) 
A major doubt expressed by many was the position of individual commissioners vis-à-vis wider 
processes of change or instability in their organisation. Responses to the current financial austerity 
and changes in national policy were highlighted as particular drivers for restructuring: 
I think in one area I had three commissioners in four weeks. For the same thing. 
(Advocacy TSO) 
we need the commissioners on board I guess and I think the changes in the infrastructure 
and the management and all of that, I think that kind of impacts on the consistency of 
where we go. We get so far and I think it kind of halts because suddenly the 
commissioners change or there’s a reshaping of the structures and we kind of stand still 
for a while and then we go back a bit and then we go forward a bit. (TSO) 
The loss of established personal relationships as a result of the churn in individuals and their 
organisations was made worse by a perceived lack of good information and contractual systems within 
the public sector. This meant that TSOs often had to repeatedly provide basic information on their 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
organisations and what they had been commissioned to provide, and to re-educate commissioners on 
the underlying thinking behind local strategies: 
it sounds chaotic, even basic things like getting the right information, even the right 
contractual information... You know, confusion about who’s who, who the right person is, 
changes, people being made redundant. (TSO) 
the PCT in particular, we’ve had five different commissioners in the last two years. So in 
terms of continuity, we’ve found ourselves having to repeat things over and over again, 
thinking that they will have passed that on to those commissioners. (TSO) 
As a result of major reforms underway, particularly in the health service, the process of setting up new 
organisations, developing alternative commissioning structures and appointing individuals to work with 
these has caused a degree of chaos and delays in key decisions being made. This again had a 
negative impact on some TSOs as it meant that their funding was only extended for a temporary basis 
and they could not meaningfully plan for the future: 
the last year has felt enormously chaotic.  Simple things like staff being made redundant, 
moving on, staff are re-positioning themselves to their advantage, so we’ve got people 
from commissioners moving over to the NHS trusts in senior positions, so everybody is 
very reluctant to make decisions, hence we get late in the day, after much badgering, 
‘We’ll just extend your contract.’ I hear from 30 other organisations and they’re all doing 
the same. It doesn’t feel planned, it feels reactive. (TSO) 
 
(iii) Co-ordination of commissioning between public sector service areas  
Successful co-ordination between the work of different service areas of the public sector has been 
recognised as a vital issue in general and within mental health in particular. Such co-ordination 
appears to be a challenge on a number of levels: commissioners might be separated from allied staff 
and functions within their own organisations, there may be barriers between them and other public 
sector organisations that are nominally responsible for particular areas of policy, and there might be 
numerous challenges when thinking about whether services are experienced by users ‘at the frontline’ 
as integrated and coherent. Space and the research priorities only really permit a focus on the first of 
these challenges. 
     Our findings suggest that for those TSOs who were procured by more than one public sector body, 
or indeed more than one department within a single public sector body, there was a common 
experience of the different commissioning teams not successfully co-ordinating their work. At the most 
basic level, this appeared to be connected with public sector organisations being responsible for 
different aspects of mental health support and this included the NHS in which all the organisations are 
in principle at least part of the same overall ‘family’. This structure seemed to be replicated within 
public sector organisations, with individual or teams of commissioners responsible for planning and 
purchasing services for a particular user group: 
we’ve got three sections, we’ve got an adult section, a young carers section and a young 
adult carers section, and we had a commissioner for the young carers section and then 
we had another commissioner for the adult section, which was ridiculous. (TSO) 
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I’m not sure necessarily that having commissioned originally through the PCT was ever 
joined up in the first place.  I think there was NHS within NHS within NHS still.  There’s 
four levels of NHS that aren’t talking to each other already potentially. (Advocacy TSO) 
The structural separation of commissioners and commissioning teams was thought to be mirrored 
in the organisation of budgets, with TSOs perceiving that commissioners were in competition to attract 
or maintain the budget available to their user group. This led to a number of examples in which 
commissioners appeared to be in dispute about who should pay for a contracted service, which 
resulted in TSOs being passed between organisations or teams: 
I don’t think it’s quite there yet, because I still think there’s arguments over pots of money 
– where that pot of money sits, who should commission that. (TSO) 
there was a letter to say – from SP – “We’ve done a review and realised that we’re 
funding your service and really we shouldn’t be, it should be the NHS… So SP spoke to... 
I think it was the commissioners  to say, “Look, you need to take this up”.  PCT said, 
“Well we commission the Mental Health Trust to commission all our Mental Health 
services so really it should fit within there, so if they’ve got any spare cash then they 
should actually commission the services”.  The Trust then went, “No, no, no, no, we’re 
really maxed out, we haven’t got any spare cash, it should be the commissioners, they’re 
the ones that give us....” (TSO) 
Linked to the emphasis that some commissioners seemed to place on protecting their own budget 
there appeared to be a lack of understanding or interest in considering the public sector purse as a 
whole, with TSOs reporting examples of duplication in spending and those in which a commissioner 
would introduce an initiative that would reduce the costs to their budget whilst increasing the 
expenditure for another part of the public sector. This also was thought to result in commissioners not 
being that interested in services that they paid for which would result in savings to other 
commissioners: 
you’re not spending £2.84, but of course, the Local Authority don’t really care about that 
because it isn’t their money that I’m preventing from not being spent... (Advocacy TSO) 
going to supported living, it meant that there were three funders, Housing Benefit, 
Supporting People and the Health Authority and the Council together.  But the Health 
Authority thought it was great because at that time they renegotiated their Section 75 
money with the Council so they weren’t paying anything.  So no wonder the mental health 
commissioner from the Trust thought it was wonderful, but it was costing more for less. 
Mad. (TSO) 
The periodic restructuring within the public sector seemed to add to this fragmentation, as settlements 
that were reached between different commissioners were disregarded, and agreements negotiated 
between the new commissioners: 
I think that’s being challenged now that Public Health have gone into Social Care, there’s 
a row going on about who’s doing the commissioning. (TSO) 
you’ve got Supporting People, you’ve got elderly people provision, you’ve got mental 
health, you’ve got learning disability... what a mess!  (TSO) 
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The commissioners recognised that their structures and processes were not as integrated as would be 
ideal. They too highlighted the complications that resulted from separate budgets and financial 
responsibilities, and also the complexity caused by public sector organisations having different 
contractual requirements. The most recent restructures had led in one area to health commissioners 
being now based within the Council, and it was hoped that the informal contacts that this would foster 
may lead to better joint working in practice. One TSO participant reported that the downsizing of the 
commissioning team may have addressed the fragmentation they had experienced through replacing 
multiple roles with just one, however the viability of such an arrangement in the long term could be 
questioned: 
because our council has gone through the lean process we’ve now got one 
commissioner. So although it's not very good for her because she’s doing three times the 
amount of work in the same hours, it’s very good for us because it’s the same person sort 
of going all over. (TSO) 
Linked to this, there was often a sense of greater trust in the commissioner for mental health rather 
than those working in other service areas, which presumably arose from the personal connections and 
a shared interest in this user group: 
mental health commissioners have finally levered away from the old SP pot so for the first 
time from this April the mental health commissioners have autonomy over all of the 
money that the PCT and the Council have determined will be spent on mental health.  
That means they can join it all together much more effectively. (TSO) 
Section 4: Discussion and Conclusions 
The research reported here was guided at the outset by a set of three main questions about the place 
of commissioning in mental health services, as follows: 
• Is commissioning (and procurement and contracting as part of this) different to what went 
before?  
• What are TSOs’ experiences of procurement and contracting under a ‘commissioning 
environment?  
• What factors appear to influence the positive implementation of commissioning? 
In addition to seeking the perspective of TSOs in relation to these questions, we were determined to 
garner the views of commissioners: we wanted to consider the third sector and the public sector side 
of this relationship.  
As a general rule, in relation to the prior question of ‘who commissions’ we were struck by the 
relatively limited range of public sector organisations that were responsible for, or engaged in, the 
commissioning of mental health services. The survey that was directed at mental health TSOs across 
the conurbation was open-ended in its questions about relevant public sector organisations, and the 
general finding was that the main locus of commissioning was in local authorities and the NHS. In one 
locality, for example, it is notable that there were joint commissioning arrangements for mental health, 
based in the local authority. In terms of the ‘how’, this has been addressed throughout the findings in 
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the reporting of the experience and opinions of TSO respondents and commissioners. However, it has 
rarely been possible in this report to go into great detail about mechanisms and specific processes – 
and there are indeed interesting ways in which specific elements of commissioning have been 
conducted – because the elements would be recognisable and would therefore breach the 
confidentiality we have afforded all respondents (and indeed to the geographical location of the 
research). 
In practice, the research has highlighted a considerable degree of complexity surrounding 
commissioning – even in this limited policy field and geography – and for the sake of simplicity and 
space we have structured the report and discussion in a way that highlights some key themes that 
emerged in the course of the analysis. The remainder of this section draws the findings together, 
based on three key themes are of particular importance, before reflecting finally on further issues of 
interest and future research challenges. 
4(a) Commissioning policy and practice: continuity and change? 
A clear overall finding was that very few research participants, including commissioners, felt that 
commissioning yet operates in  the cyclical manner that is encouraged (and perhaps sometimes 
assumed) in policy. The impression instead was that commissioning tended to be conducted in a more 
ad hoc manner, with some elements of the cycle being more evident – for instance consultation and 
sometimes service (re)design – but without forming a coherent and consensually agreed whole. It was 
common in the interviews for respondents from both the third and public sectors to quickly focus on 
commissioning as the procurement and contracting element of the cycle, with the term becoming 
interpreted more as a replacement for procurement (i.e. ‘to be commissioned’). This could suggest 
that this is the element that is of most interest to participants due to the necessity for commissioners to 
allocate their funding and TSOs to access it. There were also some interviewees for whom the 
‘commissioning cycle’ was little more than a somewhat abstract concept, with the ‘softer’ elements 
being forgotten due to their current absence. 
 Understanding this lack of coherence in the here and now is closely linked to the complex picture 
about the development of a commissioning approach in a recent historical context. In other words it is 
difficult to put commissioning into a current context without understanding its longer term development 
and other associated changes in policy and practice. Perhaps the most identifiable change was that 
where services have been re-commissioned, or re-designed through a commissioning process, 
respondents recognised that many of the principles of the commissioning approach had been enacted. 
Of course, for TSOs this very much depended on whether they had been involved in such 
commissioning, or had near hand experience, perhaps through talking to individuals in their network. 
In contrast, there is an accompanying picture of many other individual services being marked by 
continuity: particularly in the case of longer term accommodation-based services, it is quite 
understandable and defensible that contracts should have been continued for many years. In such 
cases, stability and continuity is clearly highly valued by commissioners, managers within TSOs, staff, 
services users and their families.  
As a result, it is not possible to say (nor indeed, perhaps realistic to expect) that even within the 
relatively narrow field of a particular service area, there is a coherent, single picture of an approach to 
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the commissioning cycle. Across all respondents, it is clear that it proved very difficult to establish a 
commonly-agreed periodisation: namely, a clear before and after commissioning. The issues here are 
three-fold. Firstly the central (contractual) relationship between the public sector and TSOs has been 
subject to gradual and piecemeal change, so there is no clearly identifiable point in which 
commissioning was introduced. It would simply not be practical to expect that revolutionary reform 
could have been introduced in this way. Secondly – and we lack precise information on this – it is 
likely that commissioning approaches have been introduced into individual services fields and sub-
sectors at different times and within the different public sector bodies responsible for administering the 
‘new’ approach. Thirdly, there was clear evidence that individual contracts have endured in ways that 
appear not to have been influenced by changes to public policy shifts, including the rise of 
commissioning – for TSOs in such a position continuity is likely to mark the relationship. Closely 
associated with this is the longevity of many relationships between commissioners, TSOs, and 
individuals involved thus personal relationships can perhaps help smooth out disruptions caused by 
new policy priorities. More generally of course, TSOs and individuals will have experienced change in 
very different ways. 
In many cases it seems that is as much the increased prevalence of the language or rhetoric of 
commissioning which has most changed. As a result of all of the above, respondents were able to talk 
in a very nuanced manner about the pros and cons of what we might call ‘four Cs’: change, continuity, 
contestability and competition. It also reiterates earlier findings that personal relationships are crucial 
to building longer term trust and facilitating communication (Martikke and Moxham, 2010; 
Buckingham, 2009; Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002). A final way in which commissioning and trends 
in wider public policy are having an impact on practice is in relation to outcomes and ‘commissioning 
for outcomes’. Again though, the impression is of a very mixed picture between different providers, 
sub-sectors/specialisms within the mental health services field, and differences between areas. We 
also found that TSOs often support the move to specifying outcomes, in some cases pushing directly 
for the philosophical shift that it represents. Further, some TSOs made strong claims that they were 
ahead of the public sector in thinking about and operationalising this agenda.  
 
4(b) ‘The sharp end’: TSO experience of procurement and contracting 
One of the first reflections on this theme is that we did not get a unanimous sense of traditional 
complaints about ‘contract culture’. In Buckingham’s earlier work (2011), she categorised providers in 
the Supporting People into a four-fold typology. In this framework we would suggest that the majority 
of providers in this study could be considered comfortable or compliant contractors. We did however 
gather input from smaller and more peripheral organisations and they seemed to have less experience 
of commissioning: falling into Buckingham’s category of cautious contractors or community-based 
non-contractors (2011). The key point however is that whilst some TSO participants do see regular 
tendering as disruptive, overall we did not hear as strongly as we expected the traditional concerns 
and anxieties over the impact of the ‘contract culture’ – that is fears about the impact on mission, 
voice, independence and financial sustainability (Macmillan, 2010). In many ways therefore, the sense 
was instead of organisations that had reached a ‘mature’ experience of contracting: they had 
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significant experience so the traditional concerns about the impact of contracting processes were 
perhaps lessened.  It could also be that those ‘left in the game’ are those that find it easier to comply 
with contracting requirements. 
Nevertheless, there were many complaints about the procurement and contracting process which 
suggests there is plenty of room for improvement. Sometimes these appeared to be examples of poor 
practice, such as contracts not being signed, payment not being received, confirmation of contract 
extension left to the ‘last minute’, changes to monitoring or reporting requirements changing without 
consultation or even notification, and a general sense of uncertainty or poor communication. Indeed, 
these were the sorts of problems which led to the development of the voluntary sector Compact, the 
central government commissioning principles, and the idea of ‘intelligent commissioning’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2006; NAVCA, 2010; Murray, 2011), so it is concerning to see these issues still cropping up.  
More broadly, our findings suggest that there is a potentially major problem with a power imbalance 
between the public sector and third sector. Some respondents talked of an ‘arrogant’, overbearing 
public sector; or of feeling ignored and that the public sector could get away with sometimes cavalier 
treatment of providers. Conversely, there was also evidence of information deficits on the public sector 
side, with respondents reporting that the public sector sometimes comes to TSOs requesting 
information about issues on the ground, and how to improve/redesign services. TSOs sometimes felt 
that the help they willingly gave wasn’t always reciprocated. This possibility – of weaknesses on the 
public sector side – has perhaps not been brought out so explicitly within the academic and policy 
debates over the involvement of the third sector in public service delivery. A more positive reading of 
some of the experience related by both TSOs and commissioners however is that there is an 
interdependency between the two sides – and a recognition of their respective strengths – indeed the 
concept of mutual dependence between purchasers and providers is one that is noted in the 
procurement literature (Lonsdale, 2012). 
Finally, we identify four broad considerations when considering the public sector side of the 
equation. One is the general view about the competence of public sector organisations to do 
commissioning well. As part of competence we have highlighted a number of key issues. The first was 
about the skills and competence of individuals – many respondents drew attention to the importance 
of the individual carrying out the commissioning role, and the centrality of skills such as 
communication, expertise around contracting and procurement, the ability to play a brokerage role.  
This in turn raises the issue of whether enough sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable people are 
in these jobs and whether improved training and professional status would improve the experience of 
commissioning. The regular restructurings and redistribution of commissioning responsibilities 
between organisations is likely to disrupt such skills development. Secondly, TSOs reported a 
common experience of commissioning teams not successfully coordinating their work. There was a 
strong sense of different parts of the public sector – in principle all part of the same ‘family’ – being in 
reality quite based in separate silos, confusion over who is responsible for what, and that there are 
sometimes political tussles over who is responsible and who should pay. There was also a linked 
concern raised over the possible duplication of service spending – arising from or exacerbated by 
these structural divisions – and this may raise concerns over value for money and effectiveness. It is 
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also worth noting that many commissioners shared these concerns about barriers between them and 
other commissioning colleagues. Thirdly, and more generally, was the emerging sense that many of 
the complaints emerging from TSOs were of a more systemic nature: for instance the difficulties 
around tendering opportunities being communicated informally but then not materialising, 
disagreements over contractual arrangements, and changing goalposts in contract monitoring or 
inflexibility. In this case the issues seemed more to do with the ‘bureaucratic’ nature of complex public 
sector agencies, and were beyond the control of individual officers. Again a major fault line in relation 
to the systemic issues was the ability (or not) of public sector commissioners to work with the different 
institutions and processes of colleagues who were responsible for other user groups (e.g. between 
mental health and learning disability) or service areas (e.g. between housing and health care). 
Fourthly, and more generally still, it is impossible to ignore the potential impact of the very disruptive 
changes being caused by public sector (especially NHS) restructuring, spending cuts, and the 
considerable uncertainty including redundancies and staff movements. For example it was noted 
many times that commissioners had changed, or moved, or that staff posts were empty. Again the 
exact circumstances can vary but the general picture cannot be ignored. 
4(c) Mental health commissioning: in the driving seat? 
There is a general consensus in mental health policy and practice and between public and third 
sectors that the required direction of travel is to focus on mental well-being rather than mental illness 
and to facilitate recovery rather than dependency. Mirroring the challenge of the general health and 
social care system, this will require a shifting of resources from the acute and secondary sectors to 
community based and more preventative options. Commissioning is seen in policy as the process to 
achieve this shift, with commissioners in the driving seat. This research suggests that whilst 
commissioning is now embedded within the planning and purchasing of health, social care and 
housing support services it is yet to be in the position in which it can effectively oversee the system as 
a whole and drive through the necessary changes. The findings indicate that there either needs to be 
sufficient investment in the commissioning infrastructure and commissioners to ensure that they have 
the capacity and competence to fully take up this transformative role, or an acceptance that whilst 
commissioners will play a part other organisations (and in particular Foundation Trusts) will have to be 
co- or possibly main steerers of the process. The latter is somewhat at odds with the ‘purchaser-
provider’ split emphasised in health policy in recent years (but which was also introduced in the social 
care in the community care reforms) and perhaps the move to ‘lead provider’ contracts can be 
interpreted as an attempt to maintain a symbolic supremacy of the commissioner whilst in reality 
giving much power to the larger providers. Again the evidence of this study highlights that this is not 
an easy solution, as such providers (even if they are part of the public sector) may have conflicts of 
interest regarding their own need for income and they may also lack the capacity and experience of 
managing such a supply chain.  
On a positive note it would appear that whilst commissioning and in particular its emphasis on 
diversity of supply does pose potential risks for TSOs working in mental health, the TSOs within this 
study have largely maintained and in most cases grown their service offers. Furthermore the move to 
contracts rather than grants under commissioning was seen to have provided a helpful steer regarding 
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what was expected by their funders, and as a constructive and necessary challenge to TSOs who had 
not revised and updated their services for perhaps some time. The main aspiration of TSOs was not to 
return to pre-commissioning days but rather for the commissioning cycle to be fully implemented in 
mental health and for them to be engaged and informed throughout. It will always be difficult for an 
organisation to lose funding and therefore the opportunity to deliver their mission, but the overall 
sense was that TSOs were willing to accept that risk if they were able to participate in the process and 
that the delivered service was of a good standard (even if they were not the provider). This suggests 
again that a strengthening of mental health commissioning is required. 
The move to more personalised funding in mental health in the form of direct payments and 
personal health budgets will provide similar challenges (albeit it on a more micro scale) to the 
introduction of more competitive tendering in relation to financial security. However there is also much 
to be said for the potential of these options to further open up the opportunities for TSOs to deliver 
services through public funding. Arguably the key issue for the TSOs and more importantly the mental 
health system as a whole is breaking up the large block of funding that is given to Foundation Trusts 
and enabling other providers to develop more innovative and community-based alternatives. 
Furthermore if they provide a good standard of service that responds to individuals’ situations and 
needs they may have more rather than less security than at present as the service recipient will not be 
restructured or disbanded in the manner of public sector organisations and their commissioners. 
Outcomes based contracts also have some promise, but this will rely on the commissioners having the 
expertise, energy and endurance to properly set the performance measures and payment 
mechanisms. And they may not be appropriate in all services and for all individuals or groups of 
service recipients. Again involving TSOs (and other providers) in the development process will help to 
ensure that they are an enabling rather than distracting addition. 
Finally, there is also consensus that ensuring good mental health requires more than just health 
and social care services but it involves a broader range of community resources and policy areas. 
Housing, employment and education are of particular relevance, although arguably most if not all have 
some bearing. In this study it was notable that commissioning of mental health appeared to be limited 
to the core sectors of health and social care – this was apparent in the initial scoping of who is 
engaged in commissioning (in which we had hoped to involve criminal justice and employment in 
particular), the experiences of the TSOs and the partnerships and inter-organisational links that were 
described by the commissioners. This highlights that we have different planning and purchasing 
arrangements within different sectors – all might be appropriate for the individual sector in question but 
such variance is likely to generate the conditions that prevent successful working across policy and 
organisational boundaries. As we are unlikely to have a common approach across these policy areas 
in the foreseeable future it may come down to the third sector, with all its diverse and varied interests 
and emphasis on the interests of the individual, to be a potential catalyst for bringing together these 
different areas of the public sector through demonstrating the potential value of working creatively 
across boundaries and traditional interests. In many ways this has been a role the sector has been 
fulfilling for many years, the question is whether this is sustainable in increasingly straightened times 
and in contexts in which partnership working (and trust) may be being strained in a contractual and 
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increasingly privatised service landscape – for instance in the Work Programme and Transforming 
Rehabilitation (see for example Dominey, 2012). 
4(d) Conclusion and recommendations for future research and practice 
The findings of this research suggest that within this case study locality and service area the 
commissioning cycle is not yet in full operation, and that for both commissioners and TSOs the 
procurement and contracting elements continue to take precedent. Whilst there is evidence that 
practice around these elements has changed to some extent (in particular the greater use of contracts 
rather than grants and more competitive processes), there is also considerable continuity in the 
importance of personal relations between the commissioner and provider and in which organisations 
receive funding. From the perspective of TSOs the public sector can improve its procurement 
processes through ensuring that its commissioning staff have the skills and experience to undertake 
these roles, that the organisational processes are undertaken effectively and fairly, and that the 
different commissioning teams work across the user and service group silos. The tendency of the 
public sector to be driven to undertake whole system (e.g. health) and internal organisational (e.g. 
social care) changes appear to lead to considerable disruption in the commissioning process and the 
relationships that underpin it. This undermines the ability of the public sector to oversee and lead the 
changes in service models which will in turn lead to better outcomes for people who access public 
sector funded support.  
In relation to the third sector in particular a common perspective of both TSOs and commissioners 
was  the uniqueness and importance of the third sector contribution. If this is a valid observation, there 
is a question mark over whether the resulting ‘ecosystem’, that depends on mutual recognition and 
collaboration, is quite fragile, and whether is it supported in the right way through commissioning. 
Some argued that ‘price-led’ and insensitive competitive tendering was a threat to this, indeed it was 
argued that driving down costs and reliance on the private sector had damaged service quality in 
some (non-mental health) services already. A related concern is about service coverage and 
integration, and indeed above and beyond this, was the sense articulated by many that services are 
stretched and people may be falling through gaps. There was a worrying sense that in the case of 
mental health, the public sector was not providing particularly effective oversight and leadership role – 
despite this clearly being part of the wider justification for the public sector’s commissioning role. 
Again, mental health – often described as a ‘Cinderella service’ – sits in a complex relationship to the 
many disruptive wider influences discussed above, and the uncertain impact of welfare reforms and 
growing deprivation and need. One response to this might be research that is able to begin to map out 
the comparative advantage, and unique niches occupied by different types of third sector (and indeed 
other sectoral) mental health providers. 
It is important to note that very few TSOs express an expectation that they deserve special 
treatment from the public sector, and they accept that funding is conditional on evidence of 
effectiveness and impact. There was real nuance to respondents’ discussions of the complexity of 
responses to competition and collaboration/trust, re-emphasising that commissioning should be seen 
as – and can operate as, depending on the exact context – a continuum from full competition and 
transparency at the one end, to dialogue and collaboration at the other. It is not possible to view 
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commissioning as a singular entity or process that should always be followed and replicated 
elsewhere: there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution. TSOs fully recognised and were willing to discuss that 
there can be winners and losers in any funding process. There was considerable wariness towards 
‘incumbency’ and overly comfortable personal relationships; complacency towards service quality, or 
to what were sometimes described as ‘pet projects’ of commissioners and local authority members. 
Conversely, there is often scepticism to the arrival of ‘incomers’, whether regional or national TSOs 
coming in to the area having won recently tendered contracts, or the (threat of) the encroachment of 
the private sector. On the one hand this can be partly explained by annoyance at losing a contract and 
some taken for granted relationships being disrupted/broken, but there is a genuine case that 
‘outsiders’ can lack expertise and local knowledge, while expending significant resources on setting up 
new infrastructure, possibly at the expense of service users. There is also a fear that commissioning is 
being used as a convenient tool through which to drive down costs which, as some TSOs point out, 
may ultimately not be a sustainable approach, and may increase downstream costs for themselves 
and other agencies. Some TSOs feel that they are already being effectively called upon to cross-
subsidise public programmes, and there are fears (though rarely expressed) about how long this can 
continue, and for the ramifications for organisations and service users.  
Finally, commissioning can also be a tool through which to introduce and then to embed other 
kinds of policy changes, for example the redesign of ‘outmoded’ services and particularly the insertion 
of a greater outcome focus into services. This, we found, was generally accepted, and indeed 
welcomed by many TSOs, especially when it is accompanied by dialogue and negotiation with them – 
and perhaps, though unfortunately more rarely, with users. Equally, many TSOs argue strongly that it 
is them who are often trialling new approaches – innovating – and that the public sector relies on them 
to do this. Commissioning needs to remain flexible enough to ensure that this innovative potential can 
continue to be tapped. Again, this is a complex and interesting set of issues which would repay further 
research. It is also worth noting that despite the range of fears and doubts about the future noted here, 
there appeared to be evidence of considerable levels of trust and TSOs working together in local 
networks. So collaboration – for the time being at least – seems to have endured.  
(i) Recommendations for future research  
1. Better understanding of the diversity of TSOs even within narrow service based fields (which 
might draw on a variety of research within TSRC’s existing corpus). Individual TSOs draw on 
very different resource bases, vary in size and capacity, and react with a variety of different 
strategies. One way of understanding this is further consideration of Buckingham’s (2011) 
suggested typology of contractors, rooted in their resource bases and missions. But another 
addition might be thinking about the role of entrepreneurial/enterprising TSOs – for example 
those who consider they are anticipating the requirements of commissioners, or working 
outside of the framework of public sector contracting. 
2. An examination of the emergence of a possible sense of ‘comparative advantage’ within 
particular niches of public services/collaboration with relevant TSOs in common. This might be 
a different way of thinking about collaboration across (apparent) public service/TSO 
boundaries. Drawing on insights from ‘field theory’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2013) we might 
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begin to identify new ways of thinking about distinctiveness or alliances, or ‘co-sanguinity’ 
between particular parts of the sector (i.e. moving beyond traditional ways of thinking about 
‘collaboration’). 
3. What do we find when we look in other geographical locations and other public policy/service 
fields? Does this suggest alternative approaches to commissioning? 
 
(ii) Recommendations for policy and practice 
1. If commissioners are to lead the transformation of mental health services then there needs to 
be sufficient investment in their capacity and expertise to ensure that they have the tools and 
time to undertake this role. Protecting them from further restructuring for the foreseeable 
future would also have significant benefits. 
2. There needs to be a greater emphasis on engaging TSOs (and presumably other providers) in 
all of the elements of the commissioning process as a means to understanding local needs 
and developing new models to address these. TSOs can also be  facilitators for people with 
mental health problems being engaged which will further strengthen the outcomes. 
3. Lead provider arrangements need to be treated with caution. Managing such a supply chain is 
a complex process which (from an economic perspective) could lead to a strengthening of the 
dominant position of one provider in the market and (from a practical perspective) Foundation 
Trusts may not be able to fulfil this role even if they are committed to fostering smaller third 
sector providers. Mirroring the recommendations regarding the commissioners, if lead provider 
arrangements are to be introduced then there needs to be a pragmatic acceptance of the skills 
and capacity required.     
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